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DIAGNOSING THE PRESENT 
Genealogies of Terrorism pursues two interrelated goals: (1) to problematize ostensibly 
obvious assumptions about terrorism by (2) mobilizing Foucault’s genealogical mode of 
inquiry in a site beyond his own scholarly horizon. As such, the book seeks to speak to a 
diverse set of audiences interested in terrorism and political violence, Foucault studies, 
critical theory, and political theory and philosophy. My primary aim in writing the book, 
however, was to come to terms with my own confusion about what seemed to me to be 
an enormous and entirely unprecedented political transformation in the wake of the event 
we have come to know as 9/11.  
I had started my undergraduate degrees in Political Science and Philosophy at the 
University of Salzburg, Austria, in October 2001, shortly after two hijacked planes had 
taken down the iconic towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The 
curriculum in both disciplines reflected the difference that 9/11 had introduced into our 
lives. Political scientists and philosophers alike offered new courses that were nominally 
about terrorism but really dealt with topics such as religious extremism, Islamic 
fundamentalism, the political theory of Sayyid Qutb, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East, and so forth. And there was an overarching sense that whatever it was that the world 
was facing, it was an absolutely new problem that required a whole set of new political 
interventions—interventions that were swiftly implemented in the name of national and 
international security. Something about this consensus bothered me, but I could not figure 
out what it was, until I read Foucault’s La volonté de savoir.  
What struck me about Foucault’s book was the way in which it showed that modern 
sexuality is born many times, each time under highly specific conditions, and that it bears 
the marks of these multiple births. I started to wonder whether terrorism, too, was a thing 
with many beginnings, and I suspected that getting a better sense of these beginnings 
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might allow me to understand a bit more clearly why I found the collective response to 
9/11 so irritating. Lacking any sense that I was in way over my head, I thus decided to do 
what Foucault did and track down the many births of terrorism. Genealogies of Terrorism 
is the first result of this effort. 
The main difficulty in tracing a genealogy of terrorism as it presented itself—or 
perhaps better, as it was presented to us—in the wake of 9/11 was to articulate a coherent 
method. This difficulty emerged from what some scholars have described as Foucault’s 
“anti-method”1 or “non-methodology,”2 that is, a lack of consistency in Foucault’s use of 
methodological terms and his elusiveness about what might be called a “research design.” 
To be sure, Foucault had much to say about his methods. He tells us, for instance, that 
archaeology is “the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities,” while 
“genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into 
play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them.”3 Archaeology 
explores discourse in order to “discover its guiding principles, the rules of formation of 
its concepts, its theoretical elements, and so on,” while genealogy reconstructs “the 
function of the text, not according to the rules of formation of its concepts, but according 
to its objectives, the strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it 
proposes.”4 Genealogy, he writes, “means that I begin my analysis from a question posed 
in the present;” it “defines the target and the finality of the work,” whereas archaeology 
“indicates the field which I deal with in order to make a genealogy.”5 Despite Foucault’s 
extensive discussions of archaeology and genealogy, he does not offer a formalized—or 
formalizable—methodology that would tell those of us seeking to do what he did how, 
exactly, to go about it: how to determine the relevant periodizations, what archives to 
examine, which materials to read, how to read them, which analytical categories we 
should use, and so forth. Indeed, when asked about such methodological choices in a 1966 
interview, Foucault answered that “the choices that one could make are inadmissible and 
shouldn’t exist. One ought to read everything, study everything. In other words, one must 
have at one’s disposal the general archive of a period at a given moment.”6 
But what was the archive—both understood as a collection of records and as “a set [of 
discourses] that continues to function, to be transformed through history, and to provide 
 
1 Larry Shiner, “Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the Genealogy of Power-Knowledge,” History and 
Theory 21:3 (1982), 382–398. 
2 Ganahl in Colin Koopman, ed., “Ways of Doing Genealogy: Inquiry after Foucault.” A Group Interview 
with Verena Erlenbusch, Simon Ganahl, Robert W. Gehl, Thomas Nail, and Perry Zurn,” Le Foucaldien 3:1 
(2017), 6. 
3 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. David Macey 
(2004), 10–11. 
4 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, ed. Michel 
Senellart et al., trans. Graham Burchell (2007), 35–36. 
5 Michel Foucault, “Le Souci de La Vérité,” in Dits et Écrits IV, 1980-1988, ed. Daniel Defert and François 
Ewald (1994), 674. 
6 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Things,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: The Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 2, ed. James D. Faubion (1998), 263. 
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the possibility of appearing in other discourses”7—whose analysis would allow me to 
describe how an ostensibly self-evident discourse of terrorism emerged after 9/11 that 
appeared to be the only one available? Which developments had made it possible, in the 
first decade of the 21st century, to talk about terrorism as if it were utterly obvious what 
was meant by this term? Through what operations, in what periods and which 
geographical locations, and through which processes of conflict, struggle, and 
contestation had it come about that among a series of seemingly identical actions, some 
were said to be obviously terrorism while others were obviously not? Which of all the 
relevant archives were actually accessible to me? And how could I possibly “read 
everything, … know all the institutions and practices” pertaining to the particular 
moment I sought to understand without making a series of arbitrary and inadmissible 
choices about the empirical material under investigation?8 
It seemed to me that the best way to proceed was to begin with what was actually said, 
with what was, as Foucault put it, “on the very surface of discourse” in order to “make 
visible what is invisible only because it’s too much on the surface of things.”9 Once I began 
to examine post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism and foreign policy, I found explicit references 
to French counterterrorism during the Algerian Revolution, references which were right 
there on the surface of the U.S. Pentagon’s discourse during its invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
From there, a network of relations quickly emerged that further connected the Algerian 
Revolution to French counterinsurgency in Vietnam, developments in 20th-century 
international law, Bolshevik state terror, anarchist and social revolutionary resistance to 
the tsarist regime in Russia, and contestations between Jacobin proponents and 
Thermidorian detractors of the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution. While other 
connections also appeared, considerations of feasibility and narrative coherence led me to 
limit myself to following only one thread of the phenomenon I sought to better 
understand. The book, then, presents in rather chronological fashion the result of a 
genealogical investigation that started with a specific interest in the present and worked 
backward from there. 
CONTESTING TERRORISM IN THE PRESENT 
I offer this rather detailed description of the generation of Genealogies of Terrorism because 
it provides a first answer to Samir Haddad’s excellent challenge to evaluate the argument 
developed in the book by the standards of the kind of engaged critique the book defends. 
Haddad observes that the “discourse of the end of history,” which the genealogy I offer 
is intended to “diagnose, has somehow come to infect [my] approach, since only one 
paradigm—the neo-conservative one—is considered as a source of understanding 
 
7 Michel Foucault, “The Archaeology of Knowledge,” in Foucault Live. Collected Interviews, 1969–1984, ed. 
Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston (1996), 57. 
8 Foucault, "The Order of Things," 262. 
9 Foucault, “The Archaeology of Knowledge,” 58. 
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terrorism [in the present], and it is a paradigm presented as the culmination of all that has 
gone before” (Haddad, 7).  
One important way of understanding this “contamination” of the project is as a feature 
of its explanatory aim, since the book describes the conditions that made possible the 
emergence of a discourse that presents itself as the only and, indeed, the obvious 
understanding of terrorism. Put differently, if the book appears to be infected by the 
neoconservative understanding of terrorism, this is because this understanding is the 
disease, so to speak, that the genealogy serves to diagnose. The methodological 
presupposition of this approach is that the ostensibly unitary discourse of terrorism in the 
present was constituted through historically contingent events that generated a 
multiplicity of meanings which continue to circulate on the very surface of this discourse 
and are, for this very reason, difficult to see. By making them visible, I sought to reveal 
the heterogeneity, fragility, and contingency behind the ostensible self-evidence of the 
neoliberal-cum-neoconservative paradigm of terrorism that dominates our present. The 
restricted focus of analysis, and the lack of attention to contestations in the present, is an 
upshot of my effort to provide a precise description of the transformations that made 
possible this particular paradigm. On this account, the book’s failure to explore current 
and ongoing challenges put to the dominant discourse of terrorism is the effect of practical 
considerations of explanatory focus and material constraints of intellectual production. 
But Haddad is certainly right to insist that the currently dominant understanding of 
terrorism is not the only one, and that its discursive and practical contestations ought to 
be subject to critical analysis. That is, an engaged critique of terrorism intended to reveal 
transformative possibilities in the present, particularly in this post-9/11 present of 
American expansionism and liberal universalism, should examine the current dispositif 
of terrorism, as it does past instances, as a site of both control and contention. In particular, 
Haddad asks how those who are labeled terrorists understand their actions, what 
alternative notions of terrorism might emerge from state discourses beyond that of the 
United States and its allies, and what practices of resignification may be observed in 
contestations about terrorism as a global phenomenon. 
These are questions I take on in more recent work, where I focus on current 
developments in the United States around the classification of white supremacy as 
terrorism.10 Between supporters and critics of such classification, I suggest that a historical 
approach to conceptualizing white supremacy as terrorism, especially in U.S. activism 
around racial justice, sexual violence, and immigration, (1) reveals the severely truncated 
understanding of white supremacy that is operative in counterterrorism policy; (2) sheds 
light on the limitations of the conventional conceptual apparatus of terrorism as an 
emancipatory tool; and (3) yields alternative ways of understanding terrorism that harbor 
transformative resources, even as these resources remain contested, fragile, and 
 
10 See most notably “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and 
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ambiguous. In other words, instead of either uncritically endorsing or outrightly rejecting 
the categorization of white supremacy as terrorism, I argue that it contains real 
transformative possibilities, even as these possibilities are not yet realized or blocked by 
the contingencies of the current historico-political context.11 
Among the scholars who pursue the question of how those who are typically labeled 
terrorists understand their actions, let me highlight Darryl Li’s tremendous book, The 
Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity (2019), whose aim is to render 
legible as serious political visions those forms of political action and agency which, within 
a U.S.-dominated discourse, are presented as evil or pathological. Based on extensive 
ethnographic and legal work on the jihad in Bosnia, Li proposes an understanding of jihad 
as a universalist political project—one that shares the structures but not the aspirations of 
the Western liberal universalism underpinning the Global War on Terror, and one that 
produces its own classifications and justifications of political violence. Li’s reading of 
jihad in political rather than moralist or pathologizing terms by no means amounts to its 
idealization or romanticization but rather makes it available for political evaluation and 
critique. On Li’s account, jihad becomes intelligible as an alternative (not liberal but 
Islamic) universalist vision and a form of armed solidarity under conditions of U.S.-led 
imperialism in the War on Terror that produces its own ambivalences and tensions. As an 
effort to recover transformative possibilities from the practices of those who are engaged 
in political struggles, Li’s book is, in my view, an object lesson in the kind of engaged 
critique I defend in Genealogies of Terrorism. 
INTERSECTING GENEALOGIES OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
Let me now turn to Cressida Heyes’ question about the relationship between Genealogies 
of Terrorism and other critical-theoretical works on terrorism. In particular, Heyes situates 
the book in relation to Jasbir Puar’s seminal work, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism 
in Queer Times (2007) and C. Heike Schotten’s excellent book, Queer Terror: Life, Death, and 
Desire in the Settler Colony (2018), both critical interdisciplinary interventions that seek to 
challenge the received wisdom of social science research about terrorism.12  
I read Puar’s work as a “genealogy of homonationalism”13 whose primary ambition is 
to elucidate the “process of the management of queer life at the expense of sexually and 
racially perverse death in relation to the contemporary politics of securitization, 
Orientalism, terrorism, torture, and the articulation of Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and South 
 
11 My analysis here closely follows Iain Macdonald’s exceptional study of possibility in Adorno in What 
Would Be Different: Figures of Possibility in Adorno (2019). 
12 I would add Eqbal Ahmad’s 1998 lecture, “Terrorism: Theirs and Ours,” Edward Said’s work—such as the 
2001 interview “Origins of Terrorism” and the 2006 essay “The Essential Terrorist”—, and Judith Butler’s 
2004 book Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence as pioneering works of interdisciplinary 
humanities scholarship that anticipate and critically engage formations of terrorism in the War on Terror and 
that were influential for me in developing my view. 
13 Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Tenth Anniversary Expanded Edition, 
with a new foreword by Tavia Nyong’o and a postscript by the author (2018), 40; 61; 62. 
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Asian sexualities.”14 Puar’s central claim is that queerness has become productive and 
desirable within a context of biopolitical global governance, with the so-called War on 
Terror as a privileged site of this articulation. On her account, queerness is at once a sign 
of civilizational status and abjection, a site of division where “properly” queer people are 
distinguished from perversely sexualized and racialized “terrorist look-alikes.”15 The 
inclusion of some queer people and political progress for some sexual minorities, in other 
words, is subject to a disciplinary and biopolitical calculus in which apparent advances 
turn out to be a mode of managing some lives while exposing others to death. Terrorist 
Assemblages exposes how multiple and ambivalent discourses, practices, and subjectivities 
are played off against one another in the service of U.S. nation and empire-building. Yet 
whereas Puar dissects the ways in which terrorism today functions in the service of 
homonationalism as a key site through which (some) queer people are brought into the 
fold of the nation state, Genealogies of Terrorism supplements this analysis with a historical 
account of the contingent developments through which terrorism became the kind of 
thing that could assume this role.  
Like Puar, Schotten draws on queer theory, as well as settler colonial studies and the 
history of political thought, to account for the currently dominant paradigm of terrorism 
in the War on Terror, an ambition Schotten and I clearly have in common. But while 
Genealogies of Terrorism examines the emergence of the present neoliberal dispositif of 
terrorism in the French, Russian, and Algerian revolutions as key sites of its historical 
formation, Schotten focuses on the place of terrorism within the settler-imperialist logic 
of a U.S.-Israeli alliance—a geopolitical context that remains unexplored in my work. 
Based on a wide-ranging theoretical argument that explicates the futurist temporality of 
settler colonial expansion, Schotten argues that “terrorism” today is the chief ideological 
tool to delegitimize opposition to such expansion. Because settler sovereignty is justified 
for the preservation of life, its continued existence requires the production of ever new 
mortal threats to settler life, be they “savages,” “queers,” or “terrorists” who refuse to be 
brought into the fold of settler colonial empire. On her view, then, “terrorism” does not 
name some empirical fact about the world but marks a structural position within the 
theoretical and ideological architecture of settler sovereignty; a position that is 
necessitated by the imperative to defend colonial expansion and secure the future of 
settler life. 
While Schotten’s work sheds important light on the neoconservative paradigm of 
terrorism and elucidates an additional node in the genealogy of contemporary terrorism, 
her structural analysis has implications for thinking about possibilities of resistance in the 
present that diverge from those of a genealogical approach. Schotten argues that in the 
neoliberal and neoconservative context of the War on Terror, “terrorism” just is the name 
given to whatever values, ideas, and practices are incompatible with or unintelligible by 
the organizing norms of imperialism. To put this more strongly, given the overwhelming 
dominance of this discourse in the current moment, the meaning of terrorism is exhausted 
 
14 Puar, xxi. 
15 Puar, 52. 
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by its function as a moralizing epithet for those who stand in the way of “Western” values. 
It follows that any attempt to resist empire’s discourse of terrorism can itself only be 
understood as terrorist sympathizing or outright terrorism. This has two key implications 
for questions of resistance. First, as Schotten makes explicit in her book, when faced with 
the choice between a settler-imperial “us” and a “terrorist” other, we must resist empire 
and, consequently, “stand with the ‘terrorists.’”16 The second implication, which is left 
more implicit in Queer Terror but follows from Schotten’s analysis, is that any attempt to 
contest empire’s discourse of terrorism—for instance through linguistic contestation or by 
reclaiming the language of terrorism for emancipatory ends—will be resorbed into the 
dominant framework and facilitate the expansion of terrorism discourse and, with it, 
empire. On this view, efforts to classify white supremacist violence as terrorism, for 
example, will not only be ineffective at countering white supremacy but, on the contrary, 
will expand and reinforce the white supremacist logic that underlies the settler colonial 
and imperial discourse of terrorism. 
I take this focus on the formal possibilities of the current discourse to be the main 
difference between Schotten’s and my books. Where her analysis lays bare the structural 
logic of U.S. War on Terror discourse and locates possibilities for resistance within the 
terms of that very discourse, Genealogies of Terrorism seeks to reveal the multiplicity of 
discourses and practices of terrorism that have made this paradigm possible. Rather than 
describing its formal structures, a genealogical approach records the contingent historical 
processes and events through which it took shape. But more than that, it also treats 
terrorism today not only as a propagandistic tool of delegitimation but also as a space of 
contestation with multiple meanings and uses. Not all of these have the same political 
purchase, to be sure, but they should not, for that reason, be rejected as ineffective and 
counterproductive. Instead, it is upon us theorists to elucidate and amplify their 
transformative potential. 
THEORY, PRACTICE, RELAY 
The idea that political theorists should treat experiences of conflict and contestation as 
sources of normative content is by no means new. It has a long history, for instance in 
various traditions of critical theory from the Frankfurt School to certain strands of 20th-
century French philosophy, feminist theory, critical philosophy of race, and post- and 
decolonial theory. These traditions diverge from a common view of political philosophy 
as a normative endeavor that prescribes practices, institutions, or policies in accordance 
with a set of a priori principles. Instead, it understands the task of the theorist as 
identifying and intensifying transformative resources in concrete political struggles. Yet, 
as Sarah Hansen compellingly shows with regard to Foucauldian feminist analyses of 
gender, even scholars committed to attending to such struggles may slide into forms of 
normative argumentation that actually abstract from, rather than relay, concrete practices 
of resistance and transformation. 
 
16 C. Heike Schotten, Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony (2018), 130. 
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The account of theory as relay that I developed in Genealogies of Terrorism follows 
Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, and I examined Gary Wilder’s politics of radical literalism 
as one, though not the only, promising avenue for a relaying mode of theory in the context 
of terrorism.17 I found the notion of relay (relais) helpful because, as Perry Zurn and 
Andrew Dilts insist, it clarifies the “collaborative and intersubjective nature of the practice 
of theory” in which the theorist becomes an “accomplice” to political struggle.18 Deleuze 
highlights this collaborative dimension of theory in the mode of a relay in a 1972 interview 
with Foucault. Reflecting on the task of the intellectual in relation to political struggles, 
Deleuze describes theory and practice as different yet mutually dependent types of 
discourse that enable, transmit, and amplify one another. In contrast to traditional modes 
of thinking about practice as an application of theory or theory as derived from practice, 
Deleuze insists that their relationship always takes shape in local contexts in response to 
the specific conditions of their deployment. 
The relations between theory and practice are much more partial and fragmentary. On 
the one hand, a theory is always local, relative to a small domain, and it can have its 
application in a different domain that is more or less distant. The relation of application 
is never one of resemblance. On the other hand, from the moment theory pushes into its 
own domain, it encounters obstacles, walls, and blockages which necessitate it being 
relayed (relayée) by another type of discourse (it is this other type that eventually enables 
its passage to a different domain). Practice is an ensemble of relays (relais) from a 
theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from a practice to another. No theory 
can develop without encountering a type of wall, and it takes practice to break through 
the wall. 
For Deleuze, in other words, theory and practice need each other to overcome moments 
of blockage and depletion. When theory cannot move us further because it finds itself in 
new conditions that differ from the context of its articulation, it is practice that can help 
break this impasse. And when practice has exhausted itself in a concrete situation, it is 
theory that can preserve its power and make it fertile for other domains. Deleuze gives as 
an example of the relaying function of theory and practice Foucault’s work with the 
Groupe d’information sur les prisons (GIP): 
You [Foucault] started by analyzing theoretically a milieu of confinement like the 
psychiatric asylum in 19th-century capitalist society. Then you come to the conclusion 
that it is necessary for people who are precisely locked up to speak for themselves, to 
act as a relay (qu’ils opèrent un relais) (or, on the contrary, it is you who were already a 
relay in relation to them), and these people find themselves in the prisons, they are in 
the prisons. When you organized the Groupe d’information sur les prisons, it was on 
this basis: establish the conditions where prisoners could speak themselves. It would be 
completely wrong to say … that you moved to practice by applying your theories. There 
 
17 For an alternative account of theory as relay, see Emmanuel Renault, The Experience of Injustice: A Theory of 
Recognition, trans. Richard R. Lynch (2019). 
18 Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts, “Active Intolerance: An Introduction,” in Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault, 
the Prisons Information Group, and the Future of Abolition, ed. Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts (2016), 8. 
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was neither application nor project of reform nor investigation in the traditional sense. 
There was something else entirely: a system of relays in an ensemble, in a multiplicity 
of bits and pieces simultaneously theoretical and practical.19  
Deleuze here insists that Foucault’s work with the GIP is not a straightforward application 
of his theoretical work on prisons; but neither did Foucault observe the prison in order to 
then derive theoretical insights from its operation. Rather, as Zurn and Dilts show, the 
GIP served as a switch point, so to speak, that opened up new circuits through which the 
prisoners’ words could circulate beyond the prison and reach people outside the prison, 
other GIP chapters, and other activist organizations. But the prisoners, too, functioned as 
a relay in the struggle against the prison through political acts of insubordination that 
refused the prison’s efforts to control the flow of information. The prisoners’ participation 
in collecting and disseminating information thus took up and intensified the activist 
ambitions of Foucault’s theoretical critique of the prison as an effort to “disrupt the 
epistemology and therefore the operation of the prison.”20 By examining the GIP through 
the conceptual lens of the relay, Deleuze is able to highlight its collective and collaborative 
mode of action that consists of both theoretical and practical activities—activities that stir 
and intensify one another in a multi-pronged assault on the prison. The more general 
point, I take it, is that struggles for emancipation are most effective as collaborative 
endeavors and are not well served by a hermetic distinction between theory and practice.  
The GIP is perhaps one of the more striking examples of the work of relaying in which 
Foucault was involved. But this does not mean that his other writings, even and especially 
those that are not immediately or obviously connected to activist struggles, do not have a 
similar function.  
As Hansen shows us so well, Foucault’s oeuvre offers other models, most notably in 
the Parallel Lives series—I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister, and 
My Brother: A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century (1975) and Herculine Barbin: Being 
the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French Hermaphrodite 
(1908)—and its introductory essay “The Lives of Infamous Men.” We could add 
Disorderly Families: Infamous Letters from the Bastille Archives (1982), a collection of 
lettres de cachet which brought the sovereign power of the king into even the most remote 
corners of everyday life. The system of lettres de cachet, just as Farge’s and Foucault’s 
effort to compile them and the lives they struck, are also relays—relays that facilitated the 
circulation of power in society and relays that “restore [the] intensity” and “resonance” 
of those ordinary and infamous lives and invite us to once again feel their force.21 Like all 
of Foucault’s works, these herbaria, which reproduce singular lives “in unchanged form” 
and “without a clear purpose,”22 are “experience books”: agents of transformation that, 
through excavation, transmission, and amplification, prevent readers “from always being 
 
19 Michel Foucault,“Les Intellectuels et Le Pouvoir," in Dits et Écrits II, 1970-1975 (1994), 307; my translation. 
20 Zurn and Dilts, "Active Intolerance: An Introduction," 8. 
21 Michel Foucault, “Lives of Infamous Men,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D. 
Faubion (1994), 158. 
22 Ibid., 159. 
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the same or from having the same relation with things, with others, that they had before 
reading.”23 This, then, is the principal aim of theory as a relay in a project of engaged 
critique: to hold space for transformative possibilities that are as yet unrealized by 
eliciting an experience in the reader that provokes questions, complicates common sense, 
invites reflection, and stirs the imagination. 
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